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Prominent computational models describe a neural mechanism for learning from reward
prediction errors, and it has been suggested that variations in this mechanism are reflected
in personality factors such as trait extraversion. However, although trait extraversion has
been linked to improved reward learning, it is not yet known whether this relationship is
selective for the particular computational strategy associated with error-driven learning,
known as model-free reinforcement learning, vs. another strategy, model-based learning,
which the brain is also known to employ. In the present study we test this relationship
by examining whether humans’ scores on an extraversion scale predict individual
differences in the balance between model-based and model-free learning strategies in
a sequentially structured decision task designed to distinguish between them. In previous
studies with this task, participants have shown a combination of both types of learning,
but with substantial individual variation in the balance between them. In the current
study, extraversion predicted worse behavior across both sorts of learning. However,
the hypothesis that extraverts would be selectively better at model-free reinforcement
learning held up among a subset of the more engaged participants, and overall, higher
task engagement was associated with a more selective pattern by which extraversion
predicted better model-free learning. The findings indicate a relationship between a
broad personality orientation and detailed computational learning mechanisms. Results
like those in the present study suggest an intriguing and rich relationship between core
neuro-computational mechanisms and broader life orientations and outcomes.
Keywords: extraversion, dopamine, reinforcement learning, personality, decision-making
INTRODUCTION
It is widely hypothesized that the brain learns from rewards using
a prediction error-driven learning rule (Bush andMosteller, 1953;
Rescorla and Wagner, 1972). Prediction errors are thought to
drive learning on trial-and-error decision tasks by reinforcing
successful actions (a scheme dating back to Thorndike, 1911), and
have reliable neural correlates, notably in the firing of neurons
containing the neuromodulator dopamine (Houk et al., 1995;
Schultz et al., 1997) and in blood oxygenation signals recorded
in human functional imaging studies (McClure et al., 2003;
O’Doherty et al., 2003). In humans, this mechanism’s contribu-
tion to learning is evidenced by numerous links between learn-
ing performance, neural signatures of reward prediction errors,
and/or dopaminergic action (Frank et al., 2004; Pessiglione et al.,
2007; Schonberg et al., 2007, 2010; Cools et al., 2009; Voon et al.,
2010).
It has also long been suggested that individual differences in
reward processing mechanisms such as this one contribute to
variations in personality. In an influential review, Depue and
Collins (1999) argued for an association between variation in
incentive motivation and extraversion, and suggested that this
association might be rooted in a dopaminergic mechanism.
This work inspired a line of research establishing that extraver-
sion and related personality traits (impulsivity, reward sensitiv-
ity, approach motivation, and the behavioral activation system)
have links with reward processing (Smillie, 2013). For instance,
extraversion and its relatives predict behavioral performance,
specifically response bias for rewarded alternatives, on labora-
tory learning tasks (Corr et al., 1997; Pickering, 2004; Smillie
et al., 2007), and more real-world reward-driven behaviors such
as eating disorders and drug abuse (Dawe et al., 2004; Dawe and
Loxton, 2004). Also, speaking to the relationship between these
functions and underlying neural mechanisms, extraversion and
similar measures are associated with neural activity related to pre-
diction errors and at dopamine targets (Cohen et al., 2005; Smillie
et al., 2011), and genetic polymorphisms related to dopamine
expression (Smillie et al., 2010).
Altogether, these experiments suggest that extraversion is asso-
ciated with reward processing, potentially reflecting variation in a
reward prediction error-based learningmechanism (Cohen, 2007;
Pickering and Smillie, 2008). However, it has recently become
appreciated that such error-driven reinforcement is not exclu-
sive, but instead that the brain contains multiple distinct or
even competing pathways for learning from reward (Dickinson
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and Balleine, 2003; Daw et al., 2005; Rangel et al., 2008). One
prominent computational version of this idea (Daw et al., 2005)
suggests that the model-free reinforcement strategies tradition-
ally associated with error-driven updating are accompanied by
an additional system for model-based reinforcement learning.
Whereas a model-free strategy essentially consists of learning to
repeat rewarded actions, model-based algorithms learn a map or
model of the structure of the task, and use it to evaluate candi-
date actions more deliberatively by mental simulations of their
consequences. Model-based learning does not rely on reward
prediction errors (Gläscher et al., 2010), but it does verifiably
contribute to human and even rodent behavior (Dickinson and
Balleine, 2003; Daw et al., 2011). The classic example of the
distinction between model-free and model-based reinforcement
learning is the notion that a rat, when pressing a lever that delivers
food, might be doing so for at least two reasons. The first rea-
son, associated with model-free RL, is that the rat has learned that
pressing the lever is desirable, because previous leverpresses have
been rewarded. The model-based alternative is that the rat might
have learned that the lever delivers food, and that the food is desir-
able, and from this “model” of the action’s specific consequences,
the rat can conclude that pressing the lever is valuable. This dis-
tinction can be tested (an idea going back to Tolman, e.g., Tolman
et al., 1946) by examining how subjects adjust their behavior to
changes in their goals or the task contingencies: in a way con-
sistent with the model-free reinforcement principle of repeating
previously successful actions, or instead in a way that reflects the
use of a model of the task contingencies to re-evaluate actions
in terms of the newly changed circumstance. In the example of a
rat leverpressing, one may ask whether the rat continues to press
the lever even if the food is no longer desirable (e.g., if the rat is
fed to satiety; Dickinson and Balleine, 2003), as is predicted by
model-free but not model-based learning.
Importantly, most laboratory reward tasks do not contain such
a manipulation to differentiate which (or what mixture) of these
two mechanisms supports learning behavior. Instead, behavior is
typically ambiguous as to the underlying learning strategy, and
what is apparently the same behavior may reflect different mix-
tures of their influences in different subjects or circumstances
(Dickinson and Balleine, 2003; Daw et al., 2011). In particular,
the behavioral tasks so far used to investigate a link between
reward learning and extraversion do not establish whether the
reward learning behavior is consistent with having been produced
by (model-free) reward prediction errors, unconfounded from
model-based mechanisms.
This suggests the hypothesis that we test in our present study:
that trait extraversion will relate selectively to model-free rather
than model-based learning. Such an idea is supported by the
links between extraversion, prediction errors, and dopamine, in
light of the role of prediction errors in model-free learning.
Alternatively, extraversion might not be selective in this man-
ner. For instance, there is some evidence that neural prediction
errors (Daw et al., 2011) and dopaminergically mediated learning
(Wunderlich et al., 2012) are themselves not entirely selective for
model-free learning.
The model-based vs. model-free distinction comes from
machine learning (e.g., Sutton and Barto, 1998) and relates
most closely to previous theoretical ideas in animal learning and
computational neuroscience (Daw et al., 2005). However, this
computational distinction may also be related to other dual-
process theories, notably in human cognitive psychology and
cognitive neuroscience where researchers have long distinguished
between processes that are variously described as automatic,
procedural, or incremental vs. deliberative, declarative, or rule-
based (e.g., Sloman, 1996; Ashby and Maddox, 2005). In this
respect, another previous result suggesting the present hypoth-
esis is a study (Pickering, 2004) that argued that extraversion
was selectively linked to procedural rather than rule-based learn-
ing (which may parallel model-free vs. model-based; Otto et al.,
2013). Specifically, Pickering (2004) reported that in experiments
with category learning tasks, performance on conditions requir-
ing integrating information from various stimulus dimensions
was linked to extraversion. Conversely, performance on paired-
associate learning tasks was not linked to extraversion. Although
these tasks clearly differ on many dimensions, one salient differ-
ence is that the former tasks are believed to promote incremental
learning and the latter to promote rule-based or memorization-
based solution.
Thus, Pickering’s (2004) comparison between the tasks is sug-
gestive, but one advantage of the model-based vs. model-free
dichotomy is that the contributions of both processes can be
quantified and compared on even ground, in the context of a
single task that simultaneously engages both. The present, com-
putational view also substantially refines the more cognitive one,
by specifying a quantitative, computational mechanism and situ-
ating it in the context of a body of work on animal learning and
its mechanistic neural substrates.
Note that whereas in the human literature, the status of learn-
ing as explicit vs. implicit has been taken as a key or even defining
characteristic of the two processes, the model-based vs. model-
free distinction is defined operationally, in terms of different
learning rules, and makes no particular claim about conscious
access. However, model-free learning resists (while model-based
learning is obliterated by) dual-task interference (Otto et al.,
2013) in a manner similar to other signature implicit learning
tasks (Nissen and Bullemer, 1987; See Daw and Shohamy, 2008;
Daw and O’Doherty, 2013; Otto et al., 2013; for more discussion
of the relationships between different dual-process theories).
In the present study we attempt more finely to dissect the
relationship between trait extraversion and learning from reward
by comparing extraversion to behavior on a two-step decision
task which is designed to distinguish model-based from model-
free learning (Daw et al., 2011). The logic of the task, discussed
in more detail below, is that the different learning rules predict
different patterns of trial-to-trial adjustment of choice prefer-
ences in light of the new information given to the participant
by each trial’s outcome. By examining patterns of switching in
this multistep task (where two choices are made in sequence), it
is possible to distinguish retrospective, model-free mechanisms
(repeating previously successful actions) from more prospec-
tive, model-based learning, which evaluates options in terms of
their expected consequences at the next step. In previous studies
with this task, participants were shown to use a combination of
both model-based and model-free decision-making mechanisms,
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org September 2013 | Volume 7 | Article 525 | 2
Skatova et al. Extraversion and reinforcement learning
but with substantial individual variation in the balance between
them. If the previously reported facilitation of reward learning in
extraverts were selective for model-free behavior, this would pro-
vide further support for the nexus of function that ties together
extraversion and the error-driven learning mechanism.
METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
We tested two subsamples of participants. All participants
were recruited through a New York University message board.
Informed consent was obtained from all participants. The first
subsample was collected from October to November 2009, N =
48 (Mage = 21.7, 68% female). The second subsample was col-
lected from September to October 2012, N = 50 (Mage = 24.8,
64% female). There were no significant differences between the
two subsamples in terms of age [t(95) = −1.83, p = 0.07] and
gender [χ2(1, N = 97) = 0.182, p = 0.913]. The experimental pro-
cedures for both subsamples were identical, with the follow-
ing exceptions. The first subsample completed 350 trials of the
decision-making task, with inter-state and inter-trial intervals of
500 and 300ms, respectively. The second subsample completed
300 trials of the decision-making task, and the inter-state and
inter-trial intervals were 1500 and 1000ms. (The changes were
intended to improve the participants’ quality of decisions, as the
longer time of the overall procedure, shorter inter-stimuli inter-
val, and inter-trial interval might have imposed a greater cognitive
demand on the participants in the first sample.)
One participant was excluded from all analyses because a com-
plete dataset was not obtained due to a software crash. This left 97
participants for the reported results.
MEASURES
Participants began by filling out the extraversion subsection of the
EPQ-R questionnaire (Eysenck et al., 1985) via a computer. Next,
participants completed 350 or 300 trials (see further explanations
in the Participants subsection) of the two-step decision task (Daw
et al., 2011). Halfway through the trials, participants took a short
break.
The two-step decision-making task was designed to measure
the extent to which each individual participant relies on model-
based and model-free learning strategies. The task details were as
described by Daw et al. (2011), with the exception that subjects
completed more trials separated by shorter inter-event breaks.
In the task, participants made a series of two decisions on each
trial, and were then given either a single monetary reward, or
nothing. The first decision made (i.e., the choice at the first
stage) affected the options for the second-stage decision; see the
schematic representation of the task in Figure 1A.
Specifically, on the first stage, participants were presented with
two boxes labeled by Tibetan characters (green boxes, Figure 1A).
Each box led probabilistically to either of two pairs of second-
stage boxes (pink and blue boxes, Figure 1A). The two possi-
ble second-stage alternatives consisted of another pair of boxes
represented by new Tibetan characters (pink and blue boxes,
Figure 1A). Which of these two pairs of boxes was presented was
determined, stochastically, by the first-stage decision. Each option
in the second stage was associated with a different probability
FIGURE 1 | (A) Schematic representation of the sequential task.
Participants are first presented with two first-stage boxes. Each of the
boxes (right or left) has a fixed probability of leading to one of the two pairs
of second-stage boxes in 70% of cases, and to another pair in 30% of
cases. After participants make a first-stage decision, they need to make a
second choice, between the second-stage boxes. This leads them to
receiving a reward, or none (depicted by a dollar image), based on which
second-stage box they choose. (B) An example of reward probabilities
when choosing the second-stage box. Lines of four different colors
represent how probabilities change for four possible second-stage boxes.
To encourage participants to learn continually, the reward probabilities
diffuse according to independent Gaussian random walks.
of winning a monetary reward (vs. nothing) when chosen. To
encourage ongoing learning, the chances of payoff associated with
the four possible second-stage options were changed slowly and
independently throughout the task, according to independent
Gaussian random walks. (At each step, each reward probabil-
ity was perturbed by adding Gaussian noise with mean zero
and SD = 0.025, with reflecting boundary conditions at 25 and
75%. Figure 1B depicts an example of how the win probabilities
changed for all four boxes.) The goal of the participants was there-
fore to earn the most money by tracking which second-stage box
was currently most rewarding, and by choosing the first-stage box
most likely to lead to it.
The probabilistic coupling between first-stage choices and
second-stage options was as follows. Seventy percent of the time
(a “common” transition) the choice of each of the first stage boxes
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led to an associated pair of second-stage boxes. This relation-
ship remained the same over the course of the experiment. The
other 30% of the time, however, each first-stage choice led to the
other second-stage box not usually associated with it (a “rare”
transition). For example, if a participant chose the left green box
(Figure 1A), in 70% of cases they would experience a common
transition and see on stage two a pink pair of boxes, while in
30% of cases they would encounter a rare transition and get the
blue pair of boxes. The common/rare transition probabilities were
reversed for the right first-stage green box. At the conclusion
of the experiment, task winnings were paid in real money at a
fractional rate.
ANALYSIS STRATEGY
Model-free and model-based RL approaches have different con-
sequences for trial-by-trial adjustments in action preferences in
light of the events on each trial, which can be assessed by regress-
ing recent rewards on choices (Daw et al., 2011; Wunderlich et al.,
2012; Otto et al., 2013). To assess the extent to which a participant
relies on a model-based or model-free strategy, we evaluated the
effect of events on each trial (trial n) of the second-stage choice
on the subsequent trial (trial n + 1). The two key events on
trial n were whether or not a reward was received, and whether
this occurred after a common or rare transition to the second
stage state, given the first-stage choice on trial n. We evaluated
the impact of these events on the chance of repeating the same
first-stage choice on trial n + 1.
The logic for this approach (see also Daw et al., 2011) was that
model-free RL (e.g., the TD-λ algorithm forλ > 0) would tend to
repeat a choice that results in reward regardless of in which state
that reward occurred, predicting a positive main effect of reward.
Model-based RL instead evaluates first-stage actions in terms of
the second-stage alternatives they tend to lead to; for this reason,
the effect of a reward at the first stage depends in which pair of
boxes it was received, and an interaction of reward by transition
(common or rare) is predicted. For instance, consider a trial in
which a subject chooses the left green box at the first stage, but
received the rare (blue) boxes, and was ultimately rewarded for
their choice. A model-free learner will be more likely to repeat
the first-stage choice following this trial (since it was ultimately
rewarded); a model-based learner will, conversely, be more likely
to choose the other first-stage choice (since this is the one that
is more likely to lead to the blue boxes where the reward was
received).
According to this logic, we take the main effect of reward
as an index of model-free learning (where larger positive effects
indicate more model-free switching) and the reward by transi-
tion interaction as an indication of model-based learning (where
larger positive effects indicate more model-based switching, since
the interaction inverts the sign of the reward effect for rare tran-
sitions, which are coded as −1). In previous studies using this
task (Daw et al., 2011; Wunderlich et al., 2012; Otto et al., 2013)
participants have exhibited a mixture of both effects.
We analyzed these effects using multilevel logistic regression,
using the lme4 package (Bates et al., 2012) in the R statistical envi-
ronment (R Development Core Team, 2011). For each trial after
the first, the regression predicted the probability of staying with
the previously chosen first stage option (vs. switching) as a func-
tion of four population-level predictor variables (which were in
later analyses each further interacted with one or two between-
subject covariates). At the level of each subject, the basic model
was a 2 × 2 factorial model with factors of reward and transition.
This gives rise to four predictors: (1) whether, on the preceding
trial, the subject received a reward (1 if rewarded, −1 if unre-
warded), (2) whether, the transition from the first-stage to the
second-stage choice was common or rare probability (1 if com-
mon, −1 if rare), (3) the multiplicative interaction of the reward
and transition regressors; (4) an intercept term, which reflects a
tendency to perseverate or switch regardless of the events in the
task, e.g., regardless whether the previous option was rewarded
or not. At the group level, these four effects were all taken as
random effects, i.e., each instantiated once per subject from a
population distribution. As described below, we also included
group-level predictors, such as extraversion, interacted with these
factors. Note that only two of these effects—the main effect of
reward and its interaction with the transition type—are relevant
to the learning model, and only one (the main effect of reward) to
our particular hypothesis about model-free learning in this study.
The others are included in the model to ensure a more balanced,
factorial design.
To assess whether model-based andmodel-free learning effects
covaried with extraversion, the four explanatory variables were
each interacted, across subjects, with the participants’ extraver-
sion scores. This produced four more group-level coefficients
(the main effect of extraversion, its two-way interactions with
reward and transition, and the three-way interaction between
all factors) characterizing to what extent each of the baseline
model parameters changed, across subjects, as a function of their
extraversion scores. The extraversion scores were converted to Z-
scores prior to being entered in the analysis. Again, our main
hypothesis concerns the relationship between model-free RL and
extraversion (the extraversion by reward effect), with that for
model-based RL (the three-way interaction between reward, tran-
sition, and extraversion) also of interest, but we estimate a full
factorial model with all interactions to ensure that our results
are specific to the hypothesized interaction unconfounded by the
other, unhypothesized possibilities. In designing and carrying out
these analyses, we were guided by Gelman and Hill (Gelman and
Hill, 2007; see also Gelman et al., 2003), who tend to advocate
against excluding potential explanatory variables, especially in the
context of a multilevel model.
Finally, to examine whether the relationship between extraver-
sion and RL task performance was affected or obscured by
between-participant variations in taskmotivation or engagement,
we defined ameasure of task responsiveness (“engagement”). This
overall sensitivity to events in the RL task was measured by fit-
ting the logistic regression described before to each participant’s
choices individually. At the individual level, this model involves
four effects of intercept, reward, transition, and reward by tran-
sition, but not the between-subject terms involving interactions
with extraversion. We scored each participant’s overall sensitiv-
ity to the RL task by subtracting the model’s deviance from the
deviance of a reduced logistic regression model containing only
the intercept, i.e., an average tendency to stay or switch but no
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learning effects at all. The logic of this measure was to characterize
the extent to which subjects’ choices were responsive to the events
in each trial, without assuming either a model-based or model-
free form for this dependence. The difference of deviances is
a measure of the relative fit of the two models to the data—
thus, measuring how much better the choices are explained by
assuming the subject adjusts their preferences in light of each
trial’s outcome according to any combination of the factors of
reward and transition, vs. responding at random or with con-
stant preferences. (Specifically, this measure is the test statistic for
the likelihood ratio test comparing these models, and is related
to the approximate log Bayes factor between them; Kass and
Raftery, 1995). In order to be able to obtain unbiased estimates
of the relationship between extraversion, the engagement score,
and learning strategy, we defined the engagement score using fits
to only odd-numbered trials, while we tested the relationship
between variables of interest on only the even-numbered trials.
This ensured that engagement was defined on a different set of
data than those on which its effects were tested; avoiding any bias
that otherwise might arise from defining and testing the effect on
the same data subset.
We used this engagement score both to define a subgroup
of highly responsive participants (the top 20% on this score,
across both subsamples) for separate analysis, and also entered
it (Z-scored) as a covariate in an additional version of the
RL regression, interacted with the basic RL effects and their
interactions with extraversion to produce eight more predic-
tors. (Again, the hypothesis concerns the three-way interac-
tion of reward by extraversion by engagement, but we include
all factorial interactions to ensure the interpretability of this
result.)
The R formulas for these models were:
stay ∼ trans ∗ rew ∗ extra + (1 + trans ∗ rew |subID)
and
stay ∼ trans ∗ rew ∗ extra ∗ engage + (1 + trans ∗ rew |subID)
which were estimated using the “glmer” function with
family = binomial.
RESULTS
Subjects completed a two-stage decision task (Daw et al., 2011).
They failed to complete a small fraction of trials (average number
of missed trials, 1.4%, ±0.53 SEM) due to response time limits.
They received reward for, on average, 50.8% (±0.44 SEM) of their
completed trials. Figure 2 depicts the observed frequency of stay-
ing with a top-stage choice as a function of the previous trial’s
reward and transition, averaged across the sample.
To examine individual differences in subjects’ trial-by-trial
learning strategies in the RL task, we used a mixed effects logis-
tic regression to explain each trial’s first-stage choice in terms of
the events on the previous trial (Table 1, Daw et al., 2011). As
expected, evidence for both model-free and model-based influ-
ences on choices was observed at the group level, but with
individual variability in their degree. In particular, the reward on
a trial significantly predicted the subsequent choice (a marker for
model-free RL, see Methods; β = 0.198, Z = 7.36, p < 0.001),
and the interaction of the reward effect with transition (whether
the reward was received after a common or rare state transition,
FIGURE 2 | Observed frequencies of repeating a first-stage choice in
the second stage (“stay probability”) as a function of whether the
previous trial’s choice was rewarded (vs. not) and the transition was
common (i.e., the more likely one, given the first-stage choice) or rare.
Frequencies are averaged across participants; on average, participants
display evidence for both model-free learning (main effect of reward) and
model-based (its interaction with transition).
indicative of model-based RL) was also positive (β = 0.132, Z =
6.19, p < 0.001).
As the data for this study were collected in two subsamples
with some variations in task timing (see Methods) we tested for
differences between the groups by including an indicator vari-
able for subsample interaction with all effects in the regression.
The only such effect that reached significance was the main effect
of subsample, indicating that participants in the first subsam-
ple tended to switch more often than participants in the second
subsample (β = 0.22, Z = 2.62, p = 0.008). Seeing no differ-
ences with respect to the behaviors of interest, we conducted
the remaining analyses in this study on data from the combined
group of 97 participants.
We examined the relationship between scores on the extraver-
sion scale and RL task performance. The mean score on the
extraversion scale for the first subsample was 16.52 with a
standard deviation of 4.69, and α = 0.85. The mean score
for the second subsample was 15.2 with a standard deviation
of 5.06, and α = 0.85. There was no significant difference in
extraversion scores between the two subsamples: t(96) = −1.34,
p = 0.18.
Extraversion scores were included as a covariate in the regres-
sion on the RL task. Here, positive interactions with reward
or reward by transition would indicate better model-free or
model-based RL (respectively) for subjects with higher extraver-
sion scores. This factor interacted significantly with our indica-
tors for both model-free and model-based learning, with higher
extraversion indicating a decreased influence of both strategies
(Figures 3A,B). In particular, the interaction of extraversion with
reward (model-free) was negative (Z = −2.04, p = 0.041), and
the three-way interaction of extraversion, reward, and transi-
tion (model-based) was significantly negative (Z = −2.25, p =
0.024). Thus, personality scores did not have the hypothesized
selective effect on model-free learning, nor even the previously
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Table 1 | RL and extraversion effects for the overall sample of 97 participants, top 20%, and with engagement index: Beta coefficient estimates
with standard errors from three mixed effects logistic regression analyses.
With extraversion Top 20% With engagement
MAIN EFFECTS
Intercept (perseveration) 0.896 (0.08)*** 1.597 (0.19)*** 0.900 (0.08)***
Reward 0.198 (0.03)*** 0.453 (0.07)*** 0.224 (0.027)***
Transition 0.040 (0.02)* 0.059 (0.07) 0.036 (0.02)
Reward × Transition 0.131 (0.02)*** 0.288 (0.09)** 0.133 (0.025)***
Extraversion −0.23 (0.08)** 0.038 (0.17) −0.169 (0.04)*
Engagement – – 0.359 (0.08)***
INTERACTIONS WITH EXTRAVERSION
Reward × Extraversion −0.054 (0.03)* 0.125 (0.06)* −0.027 (0.03)
Transition × Extraversion −0.017 (0.03) −0.012 (0.06) −0.007 (0.02)
Reward × Transition × Extraversion −0.047 (0.02)* −0.044 (0.07) −0.028 (0.02)
INTERACTIONS WITH ENGAGEMENT
Reward × Engagement – – 0.148 (0.03)***
Transition × Engagement – – 0.039 (0.03)
Reward × Transition × Engagement – – 0.055 (0.03)
INTERACTIONS WITH ENGAGEMENT × EXTRAVERSION
Reward × Extraversion × Engagement – – 0.058 (0.02)*
Extraversion × Engagement – – 0.020 (0.08)
Transition × Extraversion × Engagement – – −0.052 (0.02)*
Reward × Transition × Extraversion × Engagement – – −0.037 (0.02)
***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05; model-free, model-based.
reported facilitatory impact on any sort of reward learning;
instead, higher extraversion predicted generally poorer perfor-
mance on both sorts of RL. In addition, there was a main
effect of extraversion: high extraverts tended to switch more than
participants low in extraversion (Z = −2.71, p = 0.007).
These results raise the possibility that a general disengage-
ment from or unresponsiveness to the experimental task, asso-
ciated with extraversion, was masking more selective influences
of extraversion on learning strategy. Such a generalized relation-
ship between subject performance and extraversion is consistent
with reports that under some conditions trait extraversion tends
to predict less accurate responses and faster reaction times on cer-
tain tasks (Matthews and Gilliland, 1999; Wacker et al., 2006).
To examine this possibility, we first repeated our analysis in a
sample of 20% of participants (N = 20) chosen for the best
responsiveness to the RL task (a subject engagement measure
measuring the difference in each subject’s model fit between the
learning model and a null model, with a higher score reflect-
ing higher task engagement; see Methods). For this and the
subsequent analysis, we defined task engagement based on the
performance on odd trials, and tested behavior by fitting a model
to the remaining, even trials. Consistent with the previous find-
ing that higher extraversion predicted worse performance on the
RL task, engagement and extraversion trended toward being neg-
atively correlated [r = −0.19, t(95) = −1.89, p = 0.062], though
this relationship was not significant. Similarly, the extraver-
sion scores for the 20% high performing subjects were on
average lower than those for the other 80% [–0.44 vs. 0.11;
t(28) = −2.15, p < 0.05], though well-distributed throughout the
range.
Within the subgroup of high performing subjects, higher
extraversion scores predicted better learning from reward in a
model-free fashion (positive extraversion by reward interaction,
Z = 2.02, p = 0.0432; Table 1, Figure 3C) together with no sig-
nificant relationship to model-based learning (Z = −0.559, p >
0.5; Figure 3D), a result which was in line with the original
hypothesis.
Finally, to investigate whether it is indeed the case that in the
full sample, the association between extraversion and RL strategy
depends on a participant’s overall task engagement, we repeated
the same regression analysis as previously, but additionally test-
ing the interaction of all factors with the engagement measure
(again, defined on a non-overlapping subset of trials to avoid
bias). Here, a positive three- or four-way interaction (engage-
ment by extraversion by reward or engagement by extraversion
by reward by transition) would indicate a pattern whereby the
relationship between extraversion and model free (or, respec-
tively, model-based) learning became more facilitatory for more
engaged participants. Indeed, the engagement measure interacted
positively with the association between extraversion and model-
free learning (Z = 2.11, p = 0.0344) and not significantly with
the association between extraversion and model-based learn-
ing (Z = −1.436, p = 0.1511). Directly comparing these effects
using a linear contrast, we verified that the relationship between
engagement, extraversion and model-free learning was larger
than that for model-based learning (i.e., the effect of engage-
ment is specific to model-free learning; χ2(1,N = 97) = 5.75,
p = 0.01). Thus, to the extent that a participant wasmore respon-
sive to the task, this was selectively associated with a stronger
positive coupling between extraversion and model-free learning.
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FIGURE 3 | Estimated linear relationship between extraversion and the
size of the model-free and model-based learning effects [the regression
coefficients for the main effect of reward (A) and its interaction with the
transition type (B), respectively] in the full population and in the top
20% of subjects as measured by task engagement (C and D). Shown are
the group-level linear effect, with 95% confidence curves, over points
representing each participant’s estimated individual effect, conditional on the
group level-estimate.
DISCUSSION
Previous studies have shown that extraversion is associated with
enhanced reward sensitivity (Pickering, 2004; Smillie et al., 2011).
In the current study, we aimed to revisit and refine this asso-
ciation. We assessed the relationship between extraversion and
individual differences in the specific, model-free learning strat-
egy most commonly associated with learning from reinforcement
in the brain, by using a reinforcement learning task that dis-
tinguishes this mechanism from more deliberative, model-based
learning that typically confounds it. Contrary to the hypoth-
esis, we found that overall extraversion was associated with
poorer reinforcement learning on both model-based and model-
free dimensions, apparently reflecting poor task engagement.
However, the hypothesis that extraverts would be better at model-
free RL did hold up in a subset of the more engaged participants,
and accordingly, across the full group, higher task engagement
was associated (on a different subset of trials) with a shift toward
the expected pattern, by which extraversion selectively promoted
model-free RL.
At least among the more engaged participants, then, these
results demonstrate a relationship between a broad personality
orientation and a detailed computational learning mechanism.
Moreover, although we are manifestly not in a position to infer
any causation and, in this study, did not measure any observ-
ables directly related to dopaminergic function, these findings are
consistent with other suggestions that both of these aspects of
behavior may arise due to a common dopaminergic cause. They
also fit well with and sharpen previous results using category
learning, which showed a positive association between extraver-
sion and incremental, but not rule-based learning (Pickering,
2004).
At the same time, given such previous reports linking extraver-
sion to improved reward learning, the unhypothesized rela-
tionship in our full sample between extraversion and more
generically worse reinforcement learning performance is puz-
zling. Especially combined with increased alternation between
options from trial to trial in extraverts, the pattern of their
choices, which was more weakly sensitive to reward feed-
back suggests that these participants were simply less engaged
with or responsive to the task. It may be that this complex,
multistep learning task is more cognitively demanding and/or
less engaging than others previously tested with extraversion,
promoting a previously subtler tendency among extraverts to
disengage. Hints of a tendency toward impatient or careless
performance among extraverts might also be seen in previous
findings that under certain conditions extraverts tend to be
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less vigilant and attentive than introverts (Matthews and
Gilliland, 1999).
Testing this interpretation remains an important issue for
future work. It should be possible to modulate task difficulty (e.g.,
by manipulating the speed at which options change) within the
present task, and/or compare the sequential decision task to tra-
ditional one-step tasks so as to examine whether extraverts are
sensitive to harder task demands.
In any case, it does appear that overall poor task performance
among extraverts in our sample masked the more specific rela-
tionship by which (to the extent participants were engaged in
the task) extraversion promoted model-free learning. It is also
possible that task attentiveness, operationalized by our measure
of participant engagement, was capturing the contribution of
some additional competing or interacting cognitive or motiva-
tional process, which we did not account for in our study. For
example, other researchers have pointed out that neuroticism and
associated traits can have effects (in some cases, interacting with
extraversion) on the performance in learning tasks (Pickering
et al., 1995). Further, in tasks similar or identical to the one used
here low working memory capacity (Gershman et al., 2012) or
concurrent working memory demand (Otto et al., 2013) biases
individuals away from model-based choices, leading them to rely
on model-free strategy. Future studies can examine cognitive load
and personality traits on task performance in RL to investigate
whether these other factors mediate or interact with the present
results.
Taken together with evidence linking individual differences in
pharmacological manipulations of dopaminergic function to per-
formance on learning tasks, our results may indirectly support
the idea that individual differences in dopamine are associated
with trait extraversion. For instance, individuals with higher base-
line synthesis in the striatum demonstrated better learning from
rewards in a reversal learning task (Cools et al., 2009), and there
are several reports of reward learning deficits in Parkinson’s dis-
ease that are remediated by dopamine replacement medication
(Frank et al., 2004; Bodi et al., 2009). Both in Parkinson’s patients
(Voon et al., 2010) and healthy participants (Pessiglione et al.,
2006), the dopamine precursor L-Dopa promotes learning from
reward and reward prediction error-related striatal activity in an
instrumental learning task. One note of caution for interpreting
the current study’s results in dopaminergic terms is that a recent
attempt to test the widely hypothesized linkage of dopamine,
specifically, to model-free learning using the same task we use
here (Wunderlich et al., 2012) instead reported that L-Dopa, para-
doxically, promoted model-based over model-free reinforcement
learning. However, (as discussed in that report) there are several
interpretations of such result consistent with the otherwise sub-
stantial evidence that dopamine subserves a prediction error for
model-free temporal difference learning.
Finally, our findings highlight something of a disconnect
between the way reward processing in extraversion is viewed
through the lens of personality research (which is typically
focused on broader life trends and higher level decisions) vs.
neuroscientific research (which is typically focused on neu-
ral underpinnings of short-term choices in laboratory tasks).
In personality psychology there is often a sense that extraver-
sion is beneficial (e.g., associated with positive life outcomes
Herringer, 1998; Ryan and Deci, 2001; Williams et al., 2004; Jylhä
et al., 2009), whereas the specific model-free learning mechanism
linked to extraversion here and to dopamine generally is not nec-
essarily so benign. Notably it is a prominent hypothesis that a
dominance of model-free over model-based decisions (or “habit-
ual” over “goal directed” processes) contributes to disorders of
compulsion, such as drug abuse (Everitt and Robbins, 2005;
Redish et al., 2008). Some complementary results are reported
in the personality research field. For instance, Francis (1997)
found associations between extraversion and positive attitudes
toward substance use in a large sample of pupils between 13
and 15 years old. Further, extraversion positively predicted the
number of drugs tried by adolescents whose parents were alco-
holics (Conner et al., 2010) and traffic offending in young males
(Renner and Anderle, 2000). Although such tentative evidence
exists, the possibility that extraversion can predict negative life
outcomes and the mechanisms by which it may do so remain
largely under-investigated. Results like those in the present study
suggest an intriguing and rich relationship between core neuro-
computational mechanisms and broader life orientations and
outcomes.
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